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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This is an action to review a decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah awarding compensation to
the defendant, Keith F. Hubbard, to be paid by the
plaintiffs. There are two different accidents involving
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the same injury and the only question involved in thi~
case is : Which employer and insurance carrier is liable
for the payment of compensation~ The employee who
is the defendant, Keith F. Hubbard, is entitled to compensation either from the plaintiffs or from the defendant, Western Asbestos Company, and its insurance
carrier, The State Insurance Fund. The Industrial Commission determined that the plaintiffs are liable for
the compensation. The plaintiffs believe that the decision
is wrong and :that the defendants, Western Asbestos
Company and The State Insurance Fund are responsible for the payment ·of the compensation.
A hearing was held in this case before the Industrial
Commission, F~bruary 1, 1951; ·the Commission rendered
its decision March 13, 195:1. The plaintiffs herein petitioned for rehearing, March 15,~ ~951, which 'petition for
rehearing was denied by the Commission April ,6, 1951.
(R. 80-86) Plaintiffs herein petitioned this Court
May 1, 1951 for a writ of certiorari which was issued
by this Court and served on the defendants the same
day. (R. 89)
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
On October 24, 194.9, the defendant, Keith F. Hubbard, was employed by the defendant, Western Asbestos
Company, at the salt works near Saltair, in Salt Lake
County. The State Insurance Fund at that time was
the insurance carrier for· said company. (R. 19) The
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application for compensation (R. 9) states that the date
involved was September, 1949, but the first report of
injury (R. 1) and the evidence established that the date
in question is October 2-!, 1949. (R. 19)
On that date, ~Ir. Hubbard, hereinafter referred to
as the "employee", a Inan twenty-six years of age,
was engaged in the work of lifting asbestos sheets and
beams off a hoist on the fifth floor of a building being
constructed. The hoist was electrically operated and
three sheets of asbestos weighing 120 pounds each or
360 pounds in all were hoisted to the fifth floor where the
employee was standing on a landing ready to reach out
and grab the sheets and pull them over to the floor.
On the day in question it was snowing and wet, and a
2 by 4 had been erected in front of the shaft for the
employee to brace himself against while pulling the
sheets from the hoist to the landing. On the occasion in
question, the operator of the hoist had prematurely let it
down before the sheets could be pulled onto the landing.
They were in danger of slipping off, falling down the
shaft and endangering the lives of those below. At the
fifth floor landing Mr. Rice was balancing the sheets
and the employee was pulling them. Because of the
premature slacking of the hoist line, the sheets, as
stated, were dangerously hanging over the shaft and the
employee braced himself on the 2 by 4 and used great
effort to pull the sheets over to the landing so they would
not fall down the shaft. (R. 22-24) He was braced with
the sheets in his hand and his foot against the 2 by 4.
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(R. 34) His unusual exertion resulted in a sharp pain
in the lower part of his back. The employee said to his
fellow workman "my back is killing me". (R 24, 25)
The employee first consulted a doctor, Doctor Robinson,
November 8, 1949, and during the two weeks interval he
testified on cross examination that his back bothered him
the entire time.

Q.

"Your back had bothered you the entire time f'

A.

"I would say yes." (R. 37)

Doctor Robinson, who was consulted by the employee
for treatment for this injury testified that he saw him
November 8, 9, 10, 12. (R. 52) Doctor Robinson taped
the employee's back and diagnosed his injury as low
back strain which he thought was muscular. (R. 50, 51)
Doctor Robinson took no x-rays, (R. 52) and on cross
examination admitted that the injury could have been
something else than low back strain, and that it is possible that the employee sustained a herniated disc from
the accident of October 24; that he could not tell from
the examination that he made whether or not there was
a herniated disc at that time. (R. 54) The doctor also
stated that he has never operated for a herniated disc
and has not had much experience with herniated discs.
(R. 53)
During the period between Octo her 24, and November 8, a little over two weeks from the date of the
accident until the employee saw a doctor, the employee
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testified that he lost no thne from his work, but that his
back was sore all during the time and that it bothered
him, (H. 36) that it didn't get any worse and was about
the same. (R. 37) After finishing the job for Western
Asbestos Con1pany, X ovember ~-l-, the e1nployee went to
work for Yell ow Cab and worked about three n1onths
for that company, and then commenced working for
plaintiff, Davis Nielson Company, in :March, 1950. (R. 38)
The Industrial Commission says that the employee
testified that he felt no pain in the injured area after he
was released by Doctor Robinson on or about November
12, 1949 (R. 81). But the employee made statements

to the contrary. He told his own doctor, Doctor Holbrook,
that he has had pain in this region since November,
1949, that it is constantly present, is sharp in character,

and is well localized. (Exhibit 4 and 5, R. 77-78.) Doctor
Holbrook testified that these statements were true as
he received them from the employee (R. 61). The employee admitted that he had been interviewed by Mr.
Peterson, a representative of the plaintiff, Continental
Casualty Company, and that he would not say that Mr.
Peterson's statement of the interview was incorrect. He
told Mr. Peterson that after this accident of October 24,
1949, he limped on his right leg and it was stiff (R. 46).

Mr. Peterson testified (R. 66) that the employee told
him that as a result of the accident of October 24, his
right leg was stiff, he felt pain in the back when he bent
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over, that he had to limp a little, and that the pain continued in the same region thereafter until the second
accident on July 18, 1950.
On July 18, 1950, the applicant was employed by the
plaintiff, Davis Nielson Construction Company, whose
insurance carrier at that time was the plaintiff, Continental Casualty Company (R. 20-21). In his application
for compensation (R. 9) the applicant stated that on
July 26, 1950 he had an accident while employed by
Davis Nielson Construction Company, but this date was
established at the hearing as being July 18, 1950, (R. 20)
a week earlier than alleged in the application for compensation. With reference to the accident of July 18, 1950,
the employee testified that on that date, about ten o'clock
in the morning, he was working on Flfth East Street on
the Ben Albert Apartments; across the street from the
Ambassador Club, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. ·38) as a
carpenter, and that ·he .and two other men were carrying
a form weighing. between 300 and 350 pounds. One man
was walking backwards, the employee was on the other
end and the third employee was on the side just balancing it (R. 32). The man walking backwards tripped and
this kind of flipped the employee up, and when he came
down there was a sharp pain (R. 33). This pain was in
the same region as from the accident of October 24, only
a good deal more sharp and lasting longer. He did not
feel any pain in his hip right then (R. 27-28). The employee continued to work the rest of the shift that day
and the first doctor he went to was a chiropractor,
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Doctor Carl Larson. He saw Doctor Larson August 1
(-two weeks after the accident); he didn't go to him
sooner, because he didn't think it would be necessary. He
stopped going to Doctor Larson about the 5th of August
(R. 39) and about ~-\.ugust 11, he saw Doctor Clinger who
came to his home (R. 28) and told hiin to see Doctor
Holbrook. He saw Doctor Holbrook the next day. Doctor
Holbrook states that the employee was seen by him for
the first time August 1-t, 1950 at which time he took some
x-rays (R. 56) and examined the employee and concluded
that the employee had a herniated intervertebral disc
(R. 78). He saw the employee on quite a few occasions
and on November 20, 1950, performed an operation and
determined that the employee "had a large herniated intervertebral disc which was herniated from the spine
and the lumbo sacral joint of the spine." (R. 58).
Doctor Holbrook, the employee's own doctor, was
asked by the employee's attorney, which of the two accidents, that of October 24, 1949 or that of July 18, 1950
caused the conditions found at the time of the operation.
He answered, "It would be my opinion under all the circumstances that the process of degeneration of the intervertebral disc began at the time of the original injury
and it was further aggravated by the second injury."
(R. 59).

Q. "And that the condition that you found at the
time of the operation on November 20, 1950
would have resulted from one or the other
or both of these strains 1"
A.

"Yes." (R. 59).
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On cross examination by the attorney for the
defendant, The State Insurance Fund, Dr. Holbrook
testified that the employee told him he continued to
have some trouble from the time of his original injury
to the time of the second accident, but that it would make
no difference, in his opinion, whether he did or didn't
have pain in his back after the first injury until he had
the second accident in July; the first accident would still
be the cause of the trouble. Doctor Holbrook was asked:
"In other words, he could have been normal so far as
any pain is concerned between October, 1949 and July,
1950, and your opinion would still be the same f' A.
"Yes." (R. 63). He further testified that one of the
characteristics of a herniated disc is that the pain may
subside and the patient be symptom free; that in this
case the disc was degenerated, but he could not tell
when the degeneration commenced, and that a degeneration of a disc can be due to normal wear and tear or due
to repeated injuries. He stated that it is also known that
the anatomical structure of the disc material changes
normally with the passing of age, that he couldn't tell by
looking at the disc when the degeneration began. (R. 64,
65.)
Doctor Ossman, another leading orthopedic surgeon,
also testified that a herniated disc is caused by degeneration of the disc material between the bodies of the vertebrae, that sometimes the progress is quick following a
strain or injury, and that others receive repeated strains
and injury before surgical correction is required; that it
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is assumed the inception of the hernia is traumatic, although that is controversial; that a disc injured by
trauma may go on to complete herniation without any
further trauma at all. Asked as to which of the events
in question, that of October, 1949 or that of 1950 was the
cause of the herniated disc, the doctor said, "It would be
reasonable to assume that the initial injury started the
degeneration unless there was some degeneration there
before." (R. 67-68) "and the process probably continued
to the point of herniation and correction." He stated that
his opinion would not be different if it could be assumed
that after the October accident the patient went along
normally without pain until the second accident.
The Industrial Commission (R. 81) states that the
employee testified that he had no pain in the area after
November 12, 1950. Such testimony is contrary to the
employee's own admissions as heretofore pointed out to
Mr. Peterson, and to Doctor Holbrook, his own doctor.
It is immaterial, however, according to the doctors, in
determining which accident caused the injury, which was
corrected by Dr. Holbrook, whether he had or did not
have pain during the period. And the Industrial Commission expressly finds that after the October accident,
the employee exhibited symptoms consistent with the
existence of disc damage (R. 82).
The Commission, also, in its findings states, "Two
orthopedic specialists testified that in their opinion, the
degenerative process which usually culminates in herniaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion was probably initiated by the first injury described
even though applicant became asymptomatic thereafter.
The referee therefore finds that applicant's injury of
October 24, 1949 did such damage to his lumbosacral disc
that degeneration began." The referee then related the
event of July 18, 1950 and continued, "The referee
therefore finds that the condition resulting from applicant's injury of October 24, 1949 was aggravated, an
extrusion precipiated and the process accelerated by his
injury of July 18, 1950. This finding is supported by
the testimony of Doctor Holbrook (Page 14, second hearing) and is not in conflict with Doctor Ossman's testimony." (Italics added.) We find no such testimony on
Page 14 of the second hearing. The testimony at the
second hearing commences at Page 48 of the record and
Page 14 (R. 61) is the testimony of Doctor Holbrook that
exhibits 4 and 5 (R. 77-78) correctly report the facts as
stated in the letters; and these letters show that the
employee told Doctor Holbrook that he had his trouble
since November, 1949. "While loading some asphalt, he
had a sudden pain in the low back; with radiation into
the hip; this pain has been present ever since." On Page
15 of the second hearing (R. 62) Doctor Holbrook on
cross examination was asked:

"Q. Doctor Holbrook, as I understood your answer in the question Mr. McBroom asked in
his hypothetical question was that the process
was a degeneration of the intervebral disc
began at the first injury and was aggravated
at the second injury.
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A.

That is correct."

Nor did either doctor testify that the degenerative
process was probably initiated by the first injury, as
stated by the Commission (R. 82) nor did Doctor Holbrook testify at page 14 of the second hearing or anywhere else that "An extrusion was precipitated and the
process accelerated by his injury of July 18, 1950." Both
Doctors Holbrook and Ossman stated that the first accident was the cause of the rupture, whether the patient
had pain in the leg afterwards or not. Doctor Holbrook
stated that the reason that the first accident was the
cause of the rupture, even though the accident of July,
1950 caused an immediate and severe strain, was because,
"We know that one of the characteristics of herniated
discs is that they may have pain in their backs and that
may subside and they may be symptom free, and the
period may vary between weeks and years until the patient will have no symptoms."

Q. "What happens to the disc itself 1n those
periodsf'
A.

"Apparently the disc protruded somewhat
and pressed on the nerves and then the pressure is relieved by the extruded rna terial
where it no longer interferes with the nerve
roots." (R. 64).

The medical evidence is thus, that the rupture occurred at the first injury and continued thereafter, and
if the pain subsided it was because the pressure on the
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nerves by the extruded material was relieved (R. 64).
Doctor Ossman stated that it is not unusual for a ruptured disc to go on to complete herniation without any
further trauma, or a disc may heal without the necessity
of mechanical fusion by operative procedure (R. 68).
ERROR OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Commission was wrong in holding the plaintiffs
responsible for the payment of compensation in this case.
ARGUMENT
THE COMMISSION WAS WRONG IN HOLDING PLAINTIFFS LIABLE FOR PAYMENT OF THE COMPENSATION
IN THIS CASE.

This court some 28 years ago announced the rule in
line with "the great weight of authority" that "Incapacity, which is caused or aggravated by a second injury,
received while the employee is suffering from another
injury which he had received in his employment, is the
result of the first injury." At the same time this court
also pointed out that the "aggravation theory," the doctrine that allows compensation "When an employee is
suffering from a previous existing diseased bodily condition, and such condition is aggravated by an injury
suffered by accident while at work, the employer in
whose services the accident occurs is liable to pay compensation for the resulting disability.", has no application in determining which employer is liable where two
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accidents contribute to the same injury. That case
clearly points out that the so-called"aggravation theory,"
relied upon by the Industrial Commission in its decision
in the present case, has no application whatever in the
present case. The cited case is Continental Casualty
Company v. Industrial Commission, 63 U. 59, 221 Pac.
852, decided in 1923. In that case the employee sustained
an accident July 18, 1922, he was pronounced surgically
healed, and worked continuously until December 4, 1922,
on which date he was again injured. The medical evidence was that the December injury was a recurrence of
the injury of the previous July. The Industrial Commission held that the compensation carrier at the time
of the second injury was liable. This court said that the
unavoidable conclusion was that the Commission's finding was not supportted by the evidence. This court in
reversing the Industrial Commission announced the
above first-quoted rule as the law in this state in accordance with "the great weight of authority." In its decision
this court cited Head Drilling Company v. Industrial

Ace. Comm. 177 Cal. 194, 170 Pac. 157 as one of the
authorities relied upon. And this court also in a later
case, Continental Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission 75 U. 220, 284 Pac. 313 (1929), again cited the
Head Drilling Company case in holding that a prior accident initiating an injury, later resulting in disability
upon a recurrence, entitles the employee to compep.sation
from the one who is the employer at the date of the first
accident.
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The so-called "aggravation theory" has no place in
this case. There is no question though that the employee
is entitled to compensation. But it is the plaintiffs' contention that the defendant The State Insurance Fund
is the compensation carrier liable under the undisputed
facts. The decision of this court in 1923 announced the
law in this state; that has continued to be the law up to
the present time, and has been approved many times by
this and other courts. If the employee had had a degenerated disc at the time of the accident of October 24,
as intimated could be the case by Doctor Ossman, then the
"aggravation theory" would come into play in determining whether he was entitled to compensation because the
accident of October 24 aggravated a pre-existing condition. That he would be entitled to compensation for such
accident and inury is not questioned; that would be the
true application of the "aggravation theory," and the
compensation carrier liable would be the one who was
carrying the compensation on October 24, 1949. When a
second accident aggravates the injury already caused or
aggravated by the accident of October 24, and in line with
the pronouncement of this court in 1923 in the Continental Casualty Company Case supra, plaintiffs contend
that the compensation carrier at the time of the initial
injury is the one who must pay the compensation. The
"aggravation theory" does not determine which of two
employers is liable where two different accidents occur,
one of which causes the injury and the other of which
aggravates it.
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At this time it seems that further citation of authority would be merely cumulative since there has been no
overturning of the doctrine announced in 1923 by this
court in the Continental Casualty case, supra. Ever since
that decision in 1923, the plaintiff, Continental Casualty
Company, where it has been the first insurer, has paid
claims where a second accident has caused a recurrence
of a former injury, incurred while it was the compensation carrier. \Ve do not believe that it is the prerogative
or the function of the Industrial Commission to set aside
the decision of this court and announce a different rule
of law. · This court, and not the Industrial Commission,
determines the rule of law that shall prevail in this jurisdiction, especially when that rule has been in effect and
unchanged for 28 y~ars. There is no dispute in the evidence in this case; it conclusively appears that the accident of October 24, 1949 caused the injury in question.
That accident was the beginning and the cause of the
rupture corrected by the operation of Doctor Holbrook
in November, 1950. The injury was not caused by the
accident of July 18. It existed prior to that time. Even if
it could be assumed that the injury had become quiescent,
the July 18 accident merely resulted in a recurrence of
the former injury. The evidence is without dispute that
all that the accident of July 18 did was to aggravate an
already existing injury. It did not cause the injury. The
operation was required to correct the injury caused by
the accident in 1949.
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"The aggravation theory," which the Industrial
Commision says (R. 82) is too well established "to require extended comment or case citation," is not defined
by the Commission, and there is no way of determining
from its decision what it means by "the aggravation
theory." There is no rule in this state that the second
employer and his insurance carrier must pay compensation for an injury that occurred at a former time and
place when the same is aggravated or a recurrence occurs
at a later time.
"The aggravation theory" holds that an employee
suffering from an existing bodily condition which is
aggravated or lighted up by an accident is entitled to
compensation. That is not the rule of law applicable to
the situation present in the case at bar. The Commission
was wrong in attempting to decide this case by the application of the so-called "aggravation theory."
CONCLUSION
The award of the Industrial Commission should be
set aside.
Respectfully submitted.
SHIRLEY P. JONES,
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR.,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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